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opulism has undoubtedly become one of the buzzwords of the present time. In the last few 
years, a wide range of different political outlets and politicians across the globe have been 
attributed the populist label. Not only has the phenomenon of populism received enormous 
mediatic attention with the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States of 
America in 2016 but in Europe, in the last two decades, many different populist forces have 
emerged from niche parties to the national forefront, propelling significant changes in society. 
What is the connection between such diverse political actors as Trump, Podemos in Spain, or 
Bernie Sanders? And why is the beginning of the 21st century such a favourable moment for 
populism to the point that Cas Mudde, one of the leading scholars in the field, talked about “a 
populist zeitgeist” (Mudde 2004)? 
Populist leaders and parties tend to present themselves as ‘game changers.’ However, this is a 
strategic move to which a variety of politicians resort when trying to maximise their electoral 
consensus. What really sets these political actors apart is the fact that they turn the political 
arena into a battlefield of sharply polarised confrontation, between ‘the people’ and some enemy. 
This enemy may either be represented by the power oligarchs who exploit and betray the people, 
depriving them of their sovereignty, or some outsiders jeopardising an alleged unity of the 
nation. The populist label is often applied to design bottom-up grassroots movements, like the 
Indignados in Spain, Occupy Wall Street in the USA, anti-establishment parties and movements 
like Podemos in Spain, and the Five Star Movement in Italy or even politicians like Bernie 
Sanders, and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. These political actors aim at empowering ‘the people’ 
and bringing them back at the centre of the political scene, focusing on equality and justice for 
all, even for those with less economic resources.  
However, at the same time, even right-wing politicians such as Trump, Viktor Orbán in 
Hungary, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, or parties like UKIP in the United Kingdom, the League in 
Italy, or Rassemblement National in France, with their focus on nativist ideologies and the 
perceived danger represented by immigration and the contact with ‘the foreigner’ as alien, are 
often called populist. This causes terminological confusion, since despite a common dichotomous 
view of society, left-wing populism (exemplified by Sanders, Ocasio-Cortez, or Podemos among 
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others) and right-wing populism, which can be associated with Trump, the League, UKIP, Brexit 
Party, or One Nation in Australia, have diverging value systems and ethics. 
Populism is a highly complex concept, and an adequate terminological differentiation between 
left-wing populism and right-wing populism is vital to prevent damaging false equivalences 
between movements with distinct visions of politics and society. Conflating diverging actors 
under the same ‘umbrella term’ leads to a process of euphemisation and consequent 
legitimisation, whereby far-right parties are described less negatively, allowing their ideas to 
spread more easily into mainstream discourse. Mudde (2007) argues that the label ‘populist 
radical right’ to describe right-wing forms of populism is more appropriate than ‘radical right 
populists,’ since the latter would put an emphasis on populism, a secondary characteristic in 
the case of these political forces, and away from ‘radical right,’ which is the core of the ideology. 
De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017) share this criticism and argue that what in many contexts is 
erroneously called populism, or right-wing populism, should instead be properly termed 
nationalism, on the ground of a preferential selection of ‘the people-as-the nation’ sense over 
‘the people-as-class.’ This confusion, they argue, stems from the fact that the nation-state is the 
primary context for democratic debate, and both populists and nationalists focus on the 
sovereignty of the people.  
Populism has been historically found to thrive in moments of crisis (Kazin 1995; Taggart 2000), 
and the turn of the century saw the critical juncture of a growing general disaffection of citizens 
towards politics and traditional parties viewed as outdated and incapable of dealing with 
people’s everyday problems and increasing economic inequalities. The global economic recession 
of 2008 highlighted deep social and economic divides, while the humanitarian crisis culminated 
in Europe with the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ around 2013, visible also in other regions across the 
globe, exacerbated the perceived ‘threat’ of ‘enemies at the gates’ (Bauman 2016).  
The growing electoral consensus of populist forces at the expense of mainstream parties in many 
countries raises a set of questions as to how these emerging political actors have managed to 
present themselves as more credible alternatives in the eyes of the electorate. There are two 
connected areas in which populists may be seen to diverge entirely from their political rivals 
and are more successful: communication and language. In terms of communication, the success 
of populists has been seen by many as a consequence of their social-media-savvy communication 
skills. Facebook, Twitter, and the other social media are characterised by their participative 
and interactive features and user-generated contents. Populists have exploited these features 
to mimic the direct, interpersonal communication that they claim to have with the ‘virtuous’ 
people, bypassing traditional mass media, seen as part of the ‘elite,’ and their gate-keepers. It 
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has been argued that, in the relationship between populism and social media, “the medium fits 
the message” (Bartlett 2014, 93). Indeed, the highly emotional and personalised aspects of 
populist politics has found its ideal conduit in a digital technology which constantly foregrounds 
emotions (often negative ones, such as anger and hatred against ‘the enemy,’ be it the elite or 
migrants) over reason. It is also through social media that populists can display their 
(seemingly) authentic personal, social, and political identities. One of the tenets of populism is 
exactly this pretence of authenticity, of being ‘one of the people’ or perfectly attuned to them. 
Social media are instrumental in constructing such an illusion, making users (including 
politicians) appear as ‘real people.’ Interestingly, the rise of modern populism has coincided with 
the growing success of social media, wholly constructed on the illusion of authentic social 
relations:  
 
In a time when communication technology and online interaction is no longer separated from 
our offline reality, we seem to have become even more oriented towards preserving 
authenticity in human connection and of ourselves. Accordingly, digital mediated 
communication is seemingly more dependent on authenticity illusions and a negotiated 
authenticity contract than face-to-face communication. (Enli 2015, 89) 
 
Authenticity is a staged communication process, and its degree depends on the “symbolic 
negotiations between the main participants in the communication” (Enli 2015, 3). Specifically, 
these negotiations concern aspects of trustworthiness, originality, and spontaneity. These three 
aspects are semioticised in digital mediated communication through the linguistic and 
multimodal affordances of social media, and it is through these three aspects that populists can 
present an image of themselves with which people can sympathise and identify. Social media 
favour the formation of ‘like-minded crowds’ through ‘homophily’ (Colleoni, Rozza and Arvidsson 
2014). These mechanisms enable populist leaders to build their political communities and shape 
a vision of the world where complex issues are simplified into dichotomies, like ‘us’ versus ‘them,’ 
or ‘friend’ versus ‘foe.’ 
While populism cannot be really distinguished only in terms of language (Breeze 2020, 2), it is 
language, both on social media and other media, which has become one of the most distinctive 
features of populist politics and communication. Both right-wing and left-wing populism seem 
to deliberately infringe the traditional style of mainstream politics by using colloquialisms, 
swearing, and slang, and its style “breaches taboos or indulges in use of language that appears 
to condone or even glorify violence” (Breeze 2020, 2). This kind of language is part of what 
Moffitt calls the “bad style” (2016, 44) of populism, a strategy used by populists to appear close 
to their electorate and defy the elite’s proper manners, communicative style and values 
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explicitly. The stylistically belligerent stance of populists can be interpreted along Ostiguy’s axis 
of “high” and “low” (2017), whereby the populism/anti-populism division is articulated in 
sociocultural and sociopolitical terms. The ‘low’ is identified with the populist tendency to 
personalism and coarseness, while the ‘high’ is represented by traditional parties, which claim 
to support official institutions and proper manners, including propriety in language. Not 
surprisingly, populists use a plain-spoken style, with clear and straightforward language dense 
with emotional overtones (e.g. anger, hate), thus inviting a certain kind of voters to identify with 
them. Such deliberately coarse language crusading against political correctness sometimes 
conceals more subtle dangers, like an exclusionary ideology.  
Taking its cue from the crucial role of language in populist communication, this special section 
of Iperstoria on “Populism and Its Languages” aims at exploring the various discursive 
dimensions of populist leaders and parties, mostly taking place in the digital environment. This 
special section opens with a paper by Massimiliano Demata, Michelangelo Conoscenti, and 
Yannis Stavrakakis on the construction of the concepts of populism and anti-populism and their 
metaphorical realisations in the British press in 2016, the year of the Brexit referendum and 
Trump’s victory, a crucial moment not only for British politics but also for the EU and populist 
discourse worldwide. Adopting both the methodology offered by Corpus Linguistics and the 
Corpus Approach to Critical Metaphor Analysis, the authors emphasise the critical role that 
metaphors play in orienting the public perception of populism based on shared modes of 
understanding social and political life. Following on from Brexit-related discourse, in the second 
paper, Michael Boyd proposes a fine-grained critical analytical study of an article in a British 
mid-market newspaper with a pro-Brexit stance, highlighting the discursive and multimodal 
strategies employed to negatively represent both the Remain-supporters and the judiciary, 
while stressing the positive presentation of Leavers and the newspaper role as the ‘voice of the 
people.’  
Maria Ivana Lorenzetti’s study compares right-wing populist discourses on migration in the 
national contexts of the USA and Italy, unveiling how the joint contribution of language and 
other semiotic modes is strategically exploited on social media by prominent right-wing populist 
leaders, such as Donald Trump and Italian League leader Matteo Salvini in the othering and 
exclusion of ethnic minorities. The study, adopting a critical multimodal analytical perspective, 
reveals that the two leaders employ comparable strategies. Web 2.0 affordances are crucial for 
both Trump and Salvini to enact the rhetorical exclusion of minorities while constructing their 
role as leaders and “build their people.” The social media domain is also the focus of the next 
contribution, in which Marianna Lya Zummo investigates how politicians employ social media 
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platforms to enhance authenticity and boost their connection with ‘the people.’ Within the 
framework of Social Media Critical Discourse Studies (KhosraviNik 2017), and adopting tools 
from multimodal discourse analysis, Zummo highlights how politicians of different orientation, 
i.e. American Democrat Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Italian right-wing leader Salvini, exploit 
social media affordances, and in particular live-streamed videos, creating a new politainment 
genre for the strategic performance of their authenticity. 
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez is also the focus of the next two contributions. Applying a 
methodological framework that combines the resources of qualitative approaches, such as 
transitivity, appraisal and multimodal critical discourse analysis, Margaret Rasulo explores the 
identity-populism nexus in a corpus of AOC’s tweets containing verbal and non-verbal 
instantiations of self-representational strategies. Based on the analysis, the communication 
style adopted by the politician emerges as the result of a blend of identities and life experiences, 
correspondingly sharpened by the presence of populist behaviour. Such a nexus allows AOC to 
intensify her self-presentation and build her political persona. By exploring the mechanisms 
that govern the presentation, interpretation, and framing of the antagonistic opponent via the 
analysis of delegitimisation strategies, recontextualising principles, and (re)framing processes, 
Jacqueline Aiello’s study analyses the coverage of AOC by a political commentator with a right-
wing populist ideological orientation. Her findings suggest that the delegitimisation of the 
antagonist occurs primarily by recontextualisation, whereby the antagonist’s viewpoints are 
systematically concealed, ridiculed, or the target of personal attacks, underscoring covert and 
overt sexism and racism. 
Racism and its subtle connection with right-wing populism are evident in the next paper by 
Philip Limerick. Focusing on the case of the Central Park Five, a criminal case involving the 
wrongful conviction of four African-Americans and one Latino, the paper investigates the covert 
and overt racist discourse by Trump. Applying a critical discourse analytical perspective to a 
corpus of diversified sources, the author unveils Trump’s discursive construction of African-
Americans as ‘the others’ through fearmongering, delegitimisation, and evasion, emblematic in 
his ‘law and order’ ideology, also shedding light on resistance discourse by the Central Park Five 
members. 
Antipodean populism is investigated in the next two papers. Combining a corpus linguistics 
perspective with critical stylistic analysis, Arianna Grasso investigates narratives constructed 
around the refugee crisis articulated on Twitter by selected right-populist leaders in Queensland 
State. The analysis unveils a predominantly Islamophobic ideology through the frequent 
association of asylum seekers with Islamic terrorism. In the last contribution to this special 
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section, Antonella Napolitano analyses the discursive strategies employed by Pauline Hanson, 
the founder of Australian One Nation Party, and leading right-wing exponent of Antipodean 
populism. Critical discourse analysis applied to a corpus of the leader’s most controversial 
speeches within the time span of twenty years uncovers the unfolding of the right-populist 
prototypical division between ‘the pure people’ and the ‘outsiders,’ here primarily represented 
by the Australian Aboriginals but also by Asian and Islamic communities at large. ‘The corrupt 
elite,’ as in many right-wing populist discourses promoting a nativist ideology (Wodak 2015), is 
accused of conspiring with ‘the dangerous others’ damaging ‘the legitimate people.’  
The papers published in this special section on “Populism and Its languages” cover an 
impressive range of approaches to a variety of populist actors, both left-wing and right-wing, 
and in different national contexts. All contributions show, each in its own way, the importance 
of populist language and its emphasis on authenticity and emotions. The papers have revealed 
that a full understanding of populism can only be possible through close scrutiny of its discursive 
realisations and the different modes (verbal, visual, etc.) in which it is codified. 
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